JOINTLY OWNED BY

Gateway Review

Isle of Wight Council
Cowes Floating Bridge

Version number: Final draft 1.0

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Project Owner: Colin Rowland
Gateway Review dates: 11/11/2021 to 06/12/2021

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Gateway Review Team Members:

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This report is an evidence-based snapshot of the project's status at the time of the review. It reflects the views of the independent review team, based on information evaluated over a three to four day period, and is delivered to the Project Owner immediately at the conclusion of the review.

Delivery Confidence Assessment

Delivery Confidence Assessment	Amber

The review team finds that the Floating Bridge 6 (FB6) project has a delivery confidence of **Amber**. It is acknowledged that the project has experienced significant reliability problems and associated repair costs since it first became operational. However, this Gateway Review is assessing the status of the project at a specific point in the project's life and the confidence in the project's ability to deliver its aims and objectives as it moves forward from this point.

The review team found that the significant issues which already exist are receiving management attention and there are clear plans to move the vessel back into operation in the near future.
The Amber Delivery Confidence Assessment is conditional on the recommendations identified in this report being actioned.

The Delivery Confidence assessment RAG status should use the definitions below.

RAG	Criteria Description
Green	Successful delivery of the project/programme to time, cost and quality appears highly likely and there are no major outstanding issues that at this stage appear to threaten delivery significantly
Amber/Green	Successful delivery appears probable however constant attention will be needed to ensure risks do not materialise into major issues threatening delivery
Amber	Successful delivery appears feasible but significant issues already exist requiring management attention. These appear resolvable at this stage and if addressed promptly, should not present a cost/schedule overrun
Amber/Red	Successful delivery of the project/programme is in doubt with major risks or issues apparent in a number of key areas. Urgent action is needed to ensure these are addressed, and whether resolution is feasible
Red	Successful delivery of the project/programme appears to be unachievable. There are major issues on project/programme definition, schedule, budget required quality or benefits delivery, which at this stage does not appear to be manageable or resolvable. The project/programme may need re-baselining and/or overall viability re-assessed

Summary of report recommendations

The review team makes the following recommendations which are prioritized using the definitions below.

Ref	Recommendation	Critical /Essential / Recommended
1.	**The proposed modifications to the prows and hydraulic rams should be checked and reviewed by a competent, independent third-party engineer.**	Critical
2.	**An annual testing regime should be put in place to check for fatigue cracking in the critical areas of the hinges and the ram attachment points.**	Recommended
3.	**Advice should be sought from a competent third-party engineer regarding planned modifications and upgrades.**	Essential
4.	**A new O&M manual should be written specifically covering the hydraulic system. This should be supplemented by a new hydraulic schematic with full parts list supplied therein.**	Essential
5.	**The Council should seek advice regarding an appropriate strategic and tactical spares list and spares availability/storage strategy from a competent, independent third-party engineer**.	Essential
6.	**A comprehensive review, to include taking into account work done to date, should be undertaken to assess the feasibility of options to address how the floating bridge may be operated in peak tidal flows whilst achieving the required chain clearances and other options including suspending the floating bridge operation and managing river traffic**.	Essential
7.	**The Council should train and appoint Duty Managers for FB6 so that a Duty Manager is always on shift during operating hours to act as a first responder and alleviate the demands currently placed on FB6's Manager.**	Essential
8.	**The Council should develop a succession plan to transfer the knowledge and learning accumulated by the current Strategic Manager responsible for FB6 in order to train a replacement for him in the event that he should no longer be available to be called upon by the Council.**	Essential

9.	**For resilience, the Council should satisfy itself it can obtain in a timely fashion, the services of expert technical and other professionals as may be needed in the future and on an ongoing basis in respect of the continuing operation of FB6. An assessment of the different routes to market already available to the Council (including any suitable framework agreements) should be undertaken in respect of each distinct service requirement in order to inform the Council's procurement strategy for having its future needs met.**	Recommended
10.	**The Council should satisfy itself that it has all the information it needs in respect of the matters relevant to the dispute to make good settlement decisions.**	Essential

Critical (Do Now) – To increase the likelihood of a successful outcome it is of the greatest importance that the programme/project should take action immediately.

Essential (Do By) – To increase the likelihood of a successful outcome the programme/project should take action in the near future.

Recommended – The programme/project should benefit from the uptake of this recommendation.

Background

The aims of the programme:
Floating Bridge 6 (FB6) became operational in May 2017, replacing Floating Bridge 5 (FB5) which was then 38 years old and at the end of its asset life.

A range of options for safeguarding access between East Cowes and Cowes town centres had been considered and developed since the 1990's and replacing FB5 with a new one was identified as the preferred option.

Maintaining a crossing for pedestrians and vehicles is important given it is the only crossing point over the River Medina for 5 miles and delivers a range of economic and social benefits to the local community and the region.

The driving force for the programme:
The key objectives for FB6, as set out in the 'Final Revised Business Case' of 21 September 2018 and restated in the 'Monitoring, Evaluation and Benefit Realisation Plan' of 23 October 2019 are to:

- provide direct pedestrian access between the two town centres of East Cowes and Cowes
- allow for continued river access upstream for commercial and private vessels
- provide continuity of river crossings during the delivery period
- improve reliability in operation, which has become more critical since the reserve ferry was decommissioned in 1982
- minimise congestion on the local road network, particularly where this negatively impacts the economic potential of town centres
- ensure affordable fares for a population that experiences high levels of deprivation
- safeguard and enhance the value for money of the substantial delivery of the East Cowes Regeneration Project
- enhance environmental sustainability, through reduced vehicle use, operational energy requirements and carbon emissions.

The key outcomes sought in respect of FB6 are included in Appendix C of this report.

The scheme is strongly aligned with local and regional policies, including the Solent LEP Regional Economic Plan (2014), Isle of Wight Local Transport Plan (2011 – 2038) and Isle of Wight Core Strategy (2013).

The procurement/delivery status:

Following approval of the business case the Isle of Wight Council ('the Council'), supported by technical and legal consultants, carried out a competitive procurement process for the key contractors, including naval architect, and the infrastructure elements, including the new boat itself and the slipway works.

FB6 became operational in May 2017 but has since suffered a number of reliability problems. These can be grouped into mechanical problems and problems relating to the chain, including chain depth constraining crossing at low spring ebb tides.

Current position regarding Gateway Reviews:

This is the first review that has been carried out by Local Partnerships on this project.

Purposes and conduct of the Gateway Review

Purposes of the Gateway Review

The primary purposes of a Gateway Review 5 are to assess whether the anticipated benefits are being delivered and that the ongoing contractual arrangements meet the business need.

Appendix A gives the full purposes statement for a Local Partnerships Gateway Review 5.

Conduct of the Gateway Review

This Local Partnerships Gateway Review 5 was carried out from 16th November 2021 to 18th November 2021. The main interviews were carried out remotely via video conference. Site visits were made by Richard Evans and Mark Redgard on the 9th November 2021. The review team members are listed on the front cover.

The people interviewed are listed in Appendix B.

The review team would like to thank Colin Rowland, Alex Minns, Sean Newton and their team for their support and openness, which contributed to the review team's understanding of the project and the outcome of this review.

Findings and recommendations

1: Business case and benefits management

The FB6 project was initially integrated with the overall project plans to deliver the regeneration of East Cowes and was included within the Solent Gateways Initiative. This experienced planning delays and as a result the FB6 project was separated from the East Cowes regeneration project in order to deliver the floating bridge with Local Growth Deal funds. The Council duly completed the required business cases and secured the funding to support the delivery of the FB6 project.

An outline monitoring and evaluation programme for FB6 was developed in support of the original business case. Following a challenging commissioning period and first year of operation, a 'Monitoring, Evaluation and Benefit Realisation Plan' was produced in 2019. This builds on the initial specifications identified during the planning phase and provides an outline monitoring and evaluation strategy, with a parallel benefits realisation plan setting out how the delivery of benefits can be actively managed. This sets out the relationships between the expected benefits of the scheme, the organisations that will monitor and deliver those benefits, and the timescales and review processes required throughout the operations of FB6.

It was apparent from interviews and documentary evidence that two external, independent reviews have been carried out of the FB6 business case and compliance with internal processes and procedures. The reviews found that the business case and procurement were completed in line with the steps needed to meet the grant requirements and also the requirements of the Council's procurement processes. Key recommendations were focused on the areas of governance and oversight and the review ream were pleased that the internal governance structures have since been strengthened and the FB6 Strategic Programme Board now has a strong focus on successful delivery of the remedial work packages.

2: Review of operating phase

2.1 Operational performance

Since delivery to site in early 2017, FB6 has experienced a number of operational issues affecting its reliability and availability. The issues experienced are focussed on the following areas:

- hydraulically operated prow ramps
- hydraulic drive system
- depth and clearance above bridge chains within the river channel.

2.1.1 Hydraulically operated prow ramps

FB6 is fitted with a two-stage prow which comprises two ramps which can be lowered from the raised position, whilst the floating bridge is in transit across the Medina, to a lowered position to accommodate

the profile of the East and West slipways at different states of the tide to allow vehicular traffic and foot passengers to embark and disembark without grounding or getting wet. After the vessel entered service, the review team learnt that additional transition fingers were added to the outer prow as a result of reports of vehicles grounding and to mitigate against the noise emanating from the ramp interacting with the concrete slipways.

The review team found that quite early, following commissioning of the floating bridge into service, the rams between the outer and inner rams were being overloaded. The review team was informed by interviewees during the review that the geometry of the rams and their relationship with the prows was potentially poorly designed, resulting in their inefficiency and high loads being imparted onto the rams and the ramp hinges.

The review team has learnt from a number of sources during the review of early tensile and fatigue failures of the prow fabrications adjacent to the hinges. These required their on-slip removal and repairs by DMR Engineering (DMR) in 2020 under the direction of the shipbuilder and the original naval architect. It is understood that the overall structural design of the prows is believed to be poor.

The review team learnt that the hydraulic rams began to fail relatively soon after the floating bridge entered service. It is understood the rams were repaired by DMR, who were initially approached by the shipbuilder, on at least 7 occasions.

The review team learnt there appears to be strong evidence that the failure of the rams, and the methodology and procedures employed to weld repair them, led to them being a major source of the contamination found in the hydraulic fluid, which may have contributed to the failure of the drive motors.

The review team was informed that in general the superstructure of the vessel was good and it was really the prows where the design issues appear to be centred.

2.1.2 Hydraulic drive system

The review team has learnt that there have been two distinct periods of major breakdown of the floating bridge, concerning the hydraulic system, which have led to it being taken out of service for extended periods. The first occasion occurred in 2020 and resulted from failure of the drive system and the second in 2021 for the same reason. It was noted by the review team that the drive system was not the sole reason for the floating bridge being taken out of service. Issues with the prows were also significant contributors. The bridge is currently out of service as of the date of this report.

The review team found that, on the first occasion of failure of the hydraulic system, resulting in the floating bridge being taken out of service, the issues were, in the main, dealt with through the main contractor

and/or specialists appointed by them. The remedial work involved the repair of a main drive motor, which appears from the information provided to the review team to have been damaged by oil contamination. In addition, repairs involved the changing of the oil, replacement of the filters and repair of prow hydraulic cylinders. Significantly, no changes were made to the hydraulic system as a result of this failure so any potential latent defects in the design were not uncovered.

The second failure of the hydraulic system, again resulting in the floating bridge being taken out of service, appears to have been a significantly more serious event, resulting in the complete failure of the drive motors, brakes and drive shaft to the extent that these could not be repaired and are having to be replaced. On this occasion, the repairs and remedial works are being undertaken in a more comprehensive manner not via the original contractor but by a direct appointment of a local hydraulic specialist, the involvement of the drive motor OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) and third-party specialist consultants supporting the Council's staff.

The review team was made aware of several apparent design inadequacies inherent in the hydraulic system which have led directly to the floating bridge being forced out of service.

2.1.3 Chain clearance

There have been a number of reported incidents where river traffic has struck the chains of the floating bridge, some of which are documented in Annex 2a of 'Cowes Floating Bridge - Monitoring, Evaluation and Benefit Realisation Plan' V1 dated 23/10/2019.

It is understood the Cowes Harbour Commission (CHC) requires the chains for the floating bridge to be not higher than a level of 1.5m above chart datum to provide safety of navigation by river craft.
It is evident that under certain conditions FB6 exceeds CHC's maximum chain height. The most extreme condition is reported to be the final two hours of ebb of high spring tides. However, incidences of exceeding the maximum chain height may not be limited to only these periods and conditions.

It is understood the mechanism which causes the chains to exceed CHC's maximum is the rapidly flowing currents associated with spring tides. When the floating bridge traverses the river channel, fast flowing tidal currents cause the floating bridge to be displaced sideways. This sideways displacement increases the tension in the chains pulling them up to a position higher than their normal at-rest position.

When the floating bridge is berthed on the slip of either bank, only the loading ramps and prow of the vessel make contact with the slip, the opposite, riverside, end of the vessel remains floating. Because of the nature and geometry of the berths, the floating end of the vessel remains exposed to the flow of the current within the river, with only the chains to hold the vessel in position. The review team was

informed that, when exposed to fast river flows, the weight and tension in the chains is insufficient to hold the floating end of the vessel in position. The floating end of the vessel is pushed sideways by the current pulling the chains tighter, causing them to be lifted above their normal at-rest position.

When, in operation, FB6 is currently assisted by a push boat during conditions of high tidal flows. The push boat is deployed to assist the floating bridge as it traverses the channel and acts to counteract the sideways drag/displacement experienced.

It is understood that the services for push boat assistance were procured by means of an open competitive tender process. The successful tenderer was Cowes Harbour Commission.

2.2 Resourcing and governance

FB6 is operated by directly employed Council personnel reporting to the manager responsible for the floating bridge. It is understood that the manager of the floating bridge is also responsible for managing car parking services and school crossing patrols.

Operational technical support is provided by the Council's in-house FB6 Technical Officer. It is acknowledged that the Council has recently recruited an Assistant Technical Officer for FB6 to support the Technical Officer and to share responsibility for responding to 'out of hours' call-outs. The FB6 Manager and Technical Officer both report to the Directorate of Neighbourhoods' Strategic Manager – Commercial Services. It is understood that the contracted hours of these three key personnel is 37 hrs in a normal, Monday to Friday, working week.

The hours of operation for FB6 are typically 19hrs/day Monday to Saturday and 17.5hrs/day on Sundays, with the floating bridge permanently staffed outside of operating hours.

It is understood that there are no formal provisions or standby/callout arrangements for support or response to issues which arise outside of the 'normal' 37 hr working week. Any response to breakdowns or incidents outside of this period is handled by the relevant Technical Officer on call at the time. It is recognised by senior managers within the Council that the frequent breakdowns and failures experienced with FB6 have, at times, placed a significant burden on the key personnel involved.

The review team found that the Council has well established governance for the FB6 project. The Project Board includes the Floating Bridge Technical Officer, Floating Bridge Manager, Strategic Manager Commercial Services and Director Neighbourhoods. The Project Board meets monthly and senior members of the group report back to the Strategic Programme Board, which meets bi-monthly. In addition to senior officer representation from the Project Group, the Strategic Programme Board

includes the Deputy Chief Executive, Portfolio Holder with responsibility for FB6, Strategic Legal Manager and Assistant Director of Finance.

It was apparent from meeting minutes that the Strategic Programme Board considers operational issues, the financial status of the project and more recently the legal case being explored by the Council in relation to FB6.

3: Plans for improvements in performance

3.1 Operational performance

3.1.1 Hydraulically operated prow ramps

Due to the operational criticality of the floating bridge, it has been essential for there to have been tactical plans put in place to maximise the availability of the crossing service.

The review team understands that DMR Engineering have undertaken significant changes to the structure of the prows, particularly in the regions surrounding the hinge points. The review team also understands that FB6 will have further works undertaken at Wight Shipyard next year in accordance with the options and recommendations contained within the 'Canark' report and then subsequently be dry-docked in Falmouth.

Recommendation 1: The proposed modifications to the prows and hydraulic rams should be checked and reviewed by a competent, independent third-party engineer.

The review team understands that Marico marine engineers have been employed to oversee the works to be undertaken next year in Wight Shipyard and at Falmouth Dry Dock.

Recommendation 2: An annual testing regime should be put in place to check for fatigue cracking in the critical areas of the hinges and the ram attachment points.

3.1.2 Hydraulic System

The review team understands that a range of modifications and upgrades are being carried out by AP Hydraulics (AP). These include modifications to the braking system, drive system and pump and filtration systems.

The review team was also informed that further proposed modifications include improvements to the hydraulic control of the brakes and the introduction of proportional flow joysticks to control the speed of the prows. It is understood that return to service training is planned for the crew in regard to the modifications and new control measures.

Recommendation 3: Advice should be sought from a competent third-party engineer regarding planned modifications and upgrades.

Recommendation 4: A new O&M manual should be written specifically covering the hydraulic system. This should be supplemented by a new hydraulic schematic with full parts list supplied therein.

3.1.3 Spares lists

The review team was made aware of the importance of spares' availability and spares' holding for the effective future service provision with high percentage bridge availability. Identification of critical spares and ensuring that these are readily available at very short notice was identified as key to the minimisation of downtime. Treating these parts as strategic spares incorporated into planned maintenance regimes will reduce the risk of these factors affecting bridge availability.

Recommendation 5: The Council should seek advice regarding an appropriate strategic and tactical spares list and spares availability/storage strategy from a competent, independent third-party engineer.

3.1.4 Chain clearance

The review team was made aware of previous studies which considered potential options to address the issues associated with operation of the floating bridge during periods of strong tidal currents. In addition to deployment of a push boat, it is understood that studies considered potential options to:

- provide physical support/restraint at slipway positions to enable the floating bridge to be berthed in a manner which does not lead to the chains being put under tension and thus be raised to a higher elevation
- suspend upstream/downstream navigation by river traffic during peak tidal flows when desired chain clearances cannot be achieved
- suspend operation of the floating bridge during peak tidal flows when desired chain clearances cannot be achieved
- provide a 'check chain' or line, to restrain the floating bridge against lateral displacement.

Recommendation 6: A comprehensive review, to include taking into account work done to date, should be undertaken to assess the feasibility of options to address how the floating bridge may be operated in peak tidal flows whilst achieving the required chain clearances and other options including suspending the floating bridge operation and managing river traffic.

3.2 Resourcing and governance

The review team recognised the importance of having adequate resources to manage the FB6 project and oversee its day-to-day operation. While it is encouraging that an Assistant Technical Officer has been appointed to support the existing FB6 Technical Officer, it is recognised that more senior officers with responsibility for FB6 are stretched and there is a lack of contingency to cover leave, sickness and other absences. Furthermore, detailed knowledge of the FB6 project is held by a small number of individuals. The Council should take immediate action to build resilience in the operation of FB6, reduce reliance on the goodwill of Council staff, and to develop a succession plan.

Recommendation 7: The Council should train and appoint Duty Managers for FB6 so that a Duty Manager is always on shift during operating hours to act as a first responder and alleviate the demands currently placed on FB6's Manager.

Recommendation 8: The Council should develop a succession plan to transfer the knowledge and learning accumulated by the current Strategic Manager responsible for FB6 in order to train a replacement for him in the event that he should no longer be available to be called upon by the Council.

3.3 Ongoing and future access to external expert technical and other professional advice

It was apparent from interviews and documentary evidence that the Council has needed to obtain from the market, expert technical and other professional advice from time to time to fully understand the nature of the defects that have materialised in the operation of FB6 and to identify appropriate solutions. Having ready access to such expertise is critical if the Council is to identify the cause of any such issues should they arise in the future and to be able to take remedial steps in as timely a manner as possible.

Recommendation 9: For resilience, the Council should satisfy itself it can obtain in a timely fashion, the services of expert technical and other professionals as may be needed in the future and on an ongoing basis in respect of the continuing operation of FB6. An assessment of the different routes to market already available to the Council (including any suitable framework agreements) should be undertaken in respect of each distinct service requirement in order to inform the Council's procurement strategy for having its future needs met.

3.4 Identification of all matters relevant to mediation

The review team is aware that the Council is planning to undertake mediation with the shipbuilder and naval architect with a view to resolving the matters in dispute. It is understood the points in dispute have arisen over a period of time, with some matters only coming to the attention of the Council fairly recently. This could potentially suggest there are other underlying faults within FB6 not yet known to

the Council and which would be pertinent to the mediation process in which the other parties can be expected to seek a full and final settlement. A system reliability analysis could be used for this purpose.

In order to build confidence levels and provide assurance of both overall reliability and the potential for further latent defects, it is suggested that the Council could appoint an appropriately qualified organisation to undertake a technical Reliability Assessment of the electrical and mechanical systems of FB6 based on established engineering and risk methodologies such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP).

Recommendation 10: The Council should satisfy itself that it has all the information it needs in respect of the matters relevant to the dispute to make good settlement decisions.

3.5 What would be the implications of a re-procurement?

Whilst interviews revealed some consideration of, but no current activity, to replace the floating bridge solution through a re-procurement exercise, any active consideration of such a plan will need to be undertaken in the knowledge that it will involve a lengthy and complex exercise. It would require in particular the following: revalidation of the business need and required outcomes, revalidation of the appropriate delivery model and contracting structure, identification of lessons learned from FB6 to inform future approaches, pre-procurement market engagement to assess the health and capacity of the market and help shape the Council's requirements in line with the latest best practice (see Government's Playbooks[1]), assembling a dedicated and well-resourced project delivery team (supplemented by external advisers as appropriate) to support successful delivery of a robust procurement and consideration of appropriate governance arrangements for Council oversight and direction. In parallel, a suitably skilled and resourced contract management team will continue to be needed to ensure FB6 delivers against its required outcomes and to address any future interruption in the FB6 service.

No further Local Partnerships Gateway Reviews are expected as this is a Gate 5 review. However, we believe that there might be merit in reviewing progress at some future point should the Council require an independent review.

[1] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-sourcing-and-consultancy-playbooks

APPENDIX A

Purpose of Gateway Review 5:

- Assess whether the business case justification for the project was realistic.
- Assess whether the anticipated benefits at this stage are actually being delivered.
- Confirm that the client side continues to have the necessary resources to manage the contract successfully.
- Confirm continuity of key personnel involved in contract management/'intelligent customer' roles.
- Where changes have been agreed, check that they do not compromise the original procurement.
- Assess the ongoing requirement for the contract to meet business need. Ensure that if circumstances have changed, the service delivery and contract are adapting to the new situation. Changing circumstances could affect: partner management; relationship management; service management; change management; contract management; benefits management; performance management.
- Check that there is ongoing contract development to improve value for money.
- Confirm that there are plans to manage the contract to its conclusion.
- Where applicable, confirm the validity of exit strategy and arrangements for recompetition.

APPENDIX B

Interviewees

NAME	ROLE
John Metcalfe	Isle of Wight Council – Chief Executive
Wendy Perera	Isle of Wight Council – Deputy Chief Executive
Colin Rowland	Isle of Wight Council - Director Neighbourhoods
Alex Minns	Isle of Wight Council - Assistant Director Neighbourhoods
Sean Newton	Isle of Wight Council - Strategic Manager Commercial Services
Mark Downer	Isle of Wight Council - Parking and FB6 Operations Manager
Justin Thorne	Isle of Wight Council - Strategic Manager Legal Services & Deputy Monitoring Officer
Kerry Hubbleday	Isle of Wight Council - Deputy S151 officer
David Twyman Jnr	Isle of Wight Council - FB6 Technical officer
Phil Jordan	Isle of Wight Council - Councillor
Lora Peacey Wilcox	Isle of Wight Council - Councillor
Ed Walker	CHC Harbour Master
Steve Gosden	GOSMEC/Consultant
Richard Sharland	Ian Sharland Limited/consultant
Luke Adams	DMR/engineering company (ramp and ram repairs)
Ben Rapley	DMR/engineering company (ramp and ram repairs)
Dean Goves	Longitude. Independent engineering advice/thruster options review
Michael Veal	LA Law
Thomas Young	Arch Henderson/Chartered engineer. Chain surveys/modelling
Shane Jamieson	Arch Henderson/consultant
Steve Futter	SLEP
Chris Thompson	Marico. Marine engineering consultant
Dave Carter	Systra Ltd/Business case consultants
Gordon Osborn	ABP Mer. Tidal speed monitoring.
Josh Adams	AP Hydraulics. Hydraulic repairs.

APPENDIX C

Key outcomes sought in respect of FB6[2]

- reducing queuing times
- increased crossings per day
- shorter crossing times
- greater capacity for vehicles
- reduced running costs
- improve passenger accommodation
- reduced carbon emissions
- improved energy efficiency
- less congestion in and around Newport
- increased financial and operation security
- separation of vehicles and passengers
- introduce opportunities to advertise local business and attractions
- supporting the economic well-being of the towns
- introduce new technologies for payment e.g. smart/proximity cards mobile phones

[2] These are as set out in the 'Solent Gateways Business Case' of June 2015, as restated in the 'Final Revised Business Case' of 21 September 2018 and again in the 'Monitoring, Evaluation and Benefit Realisation Plan' of 23 October 2019